The Tragedy of the Least Developed Countries

by Graham Reeder and Nathan Thanki

While there are more controversial and contentious issues regarding financing for adaptation (the report on the GCF today in COP plenary, or the report from the Adaptation Fund Board to CMP plenary), there are some interesting discussions going on elsewhere.

For example, in yesterday’s continued opening plenary of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Uganda stirred things up with a vivacious and biting criticism of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)(read World Bank) and it’s role in funding adaptation to climate change. They started by pointing out how the failure of current National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) is entirely due to the slow and inadequate financing of the GEF. When Uganda developed their NAPA plan in 2007 to deal with urgent adaptation needs, they were expecting the project to be funded and implemented as was mandated by the UNFCCC. A year later they got their project back saying that they needed to change their implementing agency because their chosen partner (UNEP) was incapable of handling a project of that size. Who the GEF would have preferred instead is unclear. Unfortunately for the GEF, Uganda does it’s homework, and decided to conduct some follow up research. Speaking with permission of Gambia on behalf of the LDC group, Uganda pointed out that UNEP has implemented even larger programmes than theirs, and therefore has both the relevant capacity and experience. Uganda maintained in no uncertain terms that the GEF had no right to dictate such terms. The NAPAs are supposed to be country driven, and are not another excuse for the World Bank to get their fingers into the development plans of the Least Developed Countries. Following up today, the LDC group went on to complain that the GEF, through its Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF), has only funded NAPAs even though there are many other activities that need urgent attention under the LDC work programme.

As countries move into the next phase of adaptation to climate change, parties like Uganda and Bangladesh want to make sure that things actually get moving; they are sick of being asked to put their own resources into developing plans that don’t get funded or implemented. Uganda gracefully pointed out that the principal of urgent and immediate needs which the NAPAs are meant to address aren’t so relevant when they finally get implemented 80 years down the road. Urgent needs are urgent needs after all. But the lack of urgency in helping LDCs respond to climate change is, in their own words, “disappointing and depressing.” The question of the Ugandan delegate highlights: what is the point of having a fund (LDCF) if access to that fund was difficult bordering on impossible? In a break away contact group on finance under SBI, Colombia made similar points about a lack of understanding that climate change is happening right now, and its impacts are being felt RIGHT NOW. She added that of all the projects the LDCF had assisted with transfer of technologies, only 2 had been for adaptation.

On top of the dire state of adaptation funding there are the severe problems that the developing world has with the GEF as the financial mechanism. There are problems with transparency around how much money is in the funds, where it is from, where it goes, who asked for it and so on. There are even more problems with transparency around the decision making process. And while the SBI and COP can make recommendations to the GEF, it is not enough. There are too many problems, too many bad experiences, and too much bad blood. It is clear why a new fund (the GCF) with a guaranteed 50% window for adaptation and answerable to the COP is so desireable.

The Ugandan intervention was definitely one of the more lively and honest that we’ve seen in this COP, but as the rich of the world continuously refuse to commit to emissions reductions while at the same time stall and backtrack on promises of adequate, additional, scaled-up and predictable funding, we can expect more of the same. It’s the same old refrain: time is running out. For some it already has.

worried about the next COP already…

-Nathan Thanki

It was just announced in the AWG-LCA (Ad-hoc working group for long-term cooperative action) that COP18 is going to be in…wait for it…Qatar!

What are the chances of the Emir, Hamad Bin Khalifa al Than, allowing for any loud and large civil society presence?

What are the chances that a Qatari COP-Presidency keeps the process open to all?

What hopes could we have (and, of course, much depends on how bad things could get here) of ever coming to a global emissions reduction agreement that is in line with the science to keep us below 2 degree warming?

Practical considerations and personal egos/relationships really do have a big impact on negotiations, policy, and therefore but for now, thoughts back to the talks here in Durban…

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Post-2012 Climate Regime: How Much Worse Can it Get?

[actually quite a lot]

by Trudi Zundel

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will end in 2012. In anticipation of that ending, Parties have been discussing what form the new UNFCCC commitments will take. The first item on the table: will there be a second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol?

Developed and developing countries have fundamentally different hopes for a Durban outcome. Developed countries are using this as an opportunity to drop out of a legally-binding protocol that they don’t support. In their opinion the KP is outdated, based on 1990 measures of “developed” and “developing” countries. China, Brazil, and India are considered developing countries under the UNFCCC, which means that their emissions are not legally restricted. Developed countries are saying that, based on total amounts emitted, these three countries are among the world’s highest emitters, and any protocol that doesn’t restrict them is useless. According to the USA, this is the reason that they refuse to sign onto the KP; really, though, for most developed countries, they don’t want to restrict their economy if their major economic competitors don’t have to.

The media has only been reporting that countries are working towards a treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, and ignoring the developing country goal of continuing commitments under the Kyoto Protocol with a complementary treaty alongside. This lack of coverage is a problem because it lowers public expectations about a second commitment period.

At COP13 in Bali, Parties agreed on the Bali Roadmap, which established a two-track system: one was a working group on the Kyoto Protocol, whose job was to improve and update the Protocol. The second was a working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA), spearheaded by the USA, whose task was to create an alternate mechanism to the Kyoto Protocol based on a shared vision among all UNFCCC parties. Now that the first commitment period of the Protocol is coming to an end, the future of these two tracks is uncertain: some of the most important negotiations here in Durban will be about the legal form of the LCA.

The legal form is very important. A new, legally-binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol would take a long time to develop and implement—during the lag-time, if the Kyoto Protocol did not continue, there would be no legal restrictions on emissions. A legally-binding treaty that would only complement the Kyoto Protocol, which is what some developing countries want, is also dangerous—legally, the most recent treaty takes precedence over earlier ones. If the new treaty is not as effective as Kyoto, it will still take legal precedence.

A new, non-legally binding treaty to replace Kyoto, which is what the US wants, would be based on a pledge-and-review system. This means that countries would commit to reduce however much they feel they can, and would not have a legal mechanism to make sure that they do even that.

The choice between a new treaty to replace Kyoto and one to complement it is a false dichotomy. Negotiators seem to be forgetting that any COP decision, like the one that came out of Cancun, is in fact legally-binding because countries are party to the UNFCCC, which is a legally-binding convention.  COP decisions do not need as much time to implement, because domestic governments do not need to ratify it. A COP decision to complement the Kyoto Protocol might be the best option for developing countries, especially given the urgency of climate change.

Politics of the New Treaty: What’s Likely to Happen?

On this issue, opinions can be reduced to a few main camps. Developed countries like Canada, Japan and Russia, spearheaded by the USA, want a non-legally binding mechanism that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. They would prefer a “pledge and review” system, in which countries determine for themselves how much they are able to reduce emissions.

The US has rigid demands for the LCA, and will not negotiate its stance under any circumstances. It wants a non-punitive pledge and review system; “symmetrical” legal obligations for developed and developing countries; and developing country pledges that are not conditional on finance.  This outcome would be disastrous for the climate—current pledges from countries under the KP would result in a global temperature rise of 5°C; without legal obligations they might fall further.

Canada has just formally announced at the COP that it is pulling out of the KP, although it has been saying this all year; Japan and Russia, too, will most likely not sign on.

The EU, who champions the “ethical developed country” cause, has said that it is open to a second commitment period, but only if other major economies (like the US, Canada, and Japan) commit, too. It will commit to a second period, however, only if there is an agreement to develop a new treaty to replace Kyoto after the second commitment period.

Developing countries are wholeheartedly in favour of a second commitment period,  but would like to see a new treaty that complements the Kyoto Protocol— it would bind the US and allow space for long-term finance, while keeping developed country commitments under the Protocol.

Neither of the opposing camps is willing to negotiate, and there is no point in having a new agreement or treaty that only  a few parties will sign onto. According to a presentation by the Third World Network yesterday, there are three possible Durban outcomes:

  1. The best deal ever!: Developing countries get everything they want—developed parties commit to a second commitment period of KP, there is a new treaty or decision alongside it that the US agrees to sign onto, in which it and other developed countries agree to longer-term finance. Emissions pledges under the second commitment period of the Protocol will limit global warming to 2°C, maybe even 1.5°.
  2. A bad deal: no second commitment period for major developed countries; a new legally-binding treaty to be developed— one that takes several years to develop, and locks in bad practices. Nothing is done for developing countries or the environment, but the multi-lateral negotiating process is saved! Any new regime will not be as strict as the Kyoto Protocol, because no developed countries would willingly sign onto something that asks more of them than the KP already does.
  3. The worst deal: Parties are at a standstill in negotiations, are not able to agree, and no deal is reached in Durban.

I understand the importance of optimism for activism. We can’t know what’s possible unless we try, etc, etc. However, I also think that it is both interesting and important to look at the best possible option within the political context. The first option above, which many NGOs and civil society groups are fighting for, is highly improbable (but I do hope that it happens). Most country positions are decided long before Durban—on issues as big as legal form, their positions are inflexible, and it’s too late now to change that. Those battles must be fought on the domestic level, long before COP rolls around. The second outcome is all too close for comfort. A new treaty would be negative progress—the proposals by the US (who holds the most power in the creation of the new regime, remember) allows developed countries to continue polluting while receiving credit for mitigation, and ignores their historical responsibility to help developing countries adapt.

Realistically, our best hope now is to do everything it takes to stop that regime change from being agreed. As Bolivia asserted in Cancun last year,  no deal is better than a bad deal. This is especially true when a legally-binding regime is on the line. We can’t let the urgency of climate change lead us to be roped into a “solution” that will make things worse than they already are.

Canada’s Idea of a Christmas Present: Backing Out of the Kyoto Protocol

~Graham Reeder

Recent information from CTV (a Canadian news agency) is showing that Canada is planning to formally back out of the Kyoto Protocol. Canada, along with Japan and Russia have been saying for a year that they do not want to make any new commitments to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) after this year, but backing out altogether places Canada in the same position as the US. This is part of a greater strategy from countries in the developed world to undermine the Kyoto Protocol, the only legally binding international document that ensures greenhouse gas reductions on behalf of both developed and developing countries.

The argument that these developed countries are touting is that the Kyoto commitments are only applicable for developed countries that are party to the KP, meaning that they do not include major emitters like China, India, and the US, and that a new treaty is needed that includes both developed and developing countries symmetrically. The truth is that emissions haven’t happened symmetrically: the developed countries that are bound by the Kyoto Protocol and the US are responsible for the vast majority of greenhouse gasses currently in the atmosphere as well as all of the current climate change being experienced. To expect countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa to pay for the mistakes of rich countries is a direct contradiction of the principles laid out in the UNFCCC and dooms us to a bottom up approach that effectively locks us into a 2-5 degrees C warmer world.

This latest development is a new low even for Canada. Canadian delegates have routinely blocked progress and lowered ambitions on all fronts at the UNFCCC, beating the US for Fossil of the Year Awards by Climate Action International for four years running, but pulling out of a legally binding protocol at such a crucial point is perhaps the biggest insult to the UN and to the rest of the world any Canadian government has committed. Canada regularly rides on its reputation of being an environmental leader, an international peacekeeper, and an all-round reasonably minded country, a reputation built for the most part by the Liberal Party of Canada in the late 20th century. The Conservatives have taken power in the last 10 years and have steadily undone almost everything that earned Canada that reputation over the past century; this could be the final blow. It is high time for Stephen Harper’s conservatives to step aside at the international level, they have shown that they are unwilling and unable to negotiate in good faith and should run back home before they embarrass Canadian citizens any further.

(The Lack of) High Hopes for Durban

by Samuli Sinisalo

On Monday the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change convenes for two weeks in Durban, South Africa. This is the 17th annual Conference of Parties, where parties come together to fulfill the framework convention. As the negotiations grow ever more technical and complex, it is good to keep in mind that the ultimate goal of the convetion is to stabilize the green house gases in the atmosphere to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. But personally I am not having my hopes very high for any major breakthroughs to that direction this time. In fact, I would consider even a few very modest steps forward as major success in Durban.

The last comprehensive breakthrough within the UNFCCC context is the Bali Action Plan from 2007. In Bali a two track approach was designed, which would ensure a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol and another longer term solution for implementing the framework convention. These two tracks, or ad-hoc working groups, were given a two year mandate and were supposed to conclude their work in Copenhagen 2009. The Copenhagen conference failed to deliver, and the mandate of the working groups was extended to Cancun 2010.

Last year, few weeks before the Cancun negotiations began, the chair of one of the long term cooperative action track released a note by the chair which included the possible outcome for the negotiations. The Bali Action Plan from 2007 included five building blocks, which were shared vision, adaptation, mitigation, tech transfer and finance. The note by the chair in 2010 included four of these, but there was no outcome for mitigation. This to me describes the current state of the negotiations.

Mitigation is a key component of the negotiations. It is the most direct response for limiting the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. At the same time it is potentially the most contested area in these negotiations. There are several probable reasons why the chair of the long term cooperative action group left mitigation out from his draft agreement prior to Cancun. Some possible explanations could be the legal form of the future commitments, the continuation of Kyoto Protocol, the role of major emitters and of course the ambition of mitigation targets. But in the end, all these boil down to the lack of political will to commit for binding domestic mitigation targets, in the developed countries. Consequently Cancun also failed to deliver and the mandate of the ad-hoc working groups was extended to Durban.

I do not think there will be a comprehensive outcome from Durban either. The most contested issues, the future of the Kyoto Protocol and the ambition of mitigation targets have not moved forward sufficiently prior to the meeting, and the political pressure has not increased sufficiently.

Personally I have put the bar for success in Durban really low. There are a few results I would like to see.

First and foremost, the UNFCCC has to maintain its credibility as the forum in which future climate decisions are held and decisions are made. If stalled continuously and indefinitely, the global political attention will shift and UNFCCC faces the threat of being sidelined and becoming irrelevant. In the future, climate decisions might take place outside the UN framework. Therefore Durban has to deliver.

The most obvious and necessary area to deliver is the finance. In Copenhagen, an agreement on finance was reached. Developed countries promised to mobilize 30bn in fast-track finance by 2012. In Copenhagen, the Conference of the Parties also decided to establish a Green Climate Fund, which would, by 2020, provide 100bn annually. A Transitional Committee was set up in Cancun to design the fund, and that committee is submitting its (contested) report to the Conference of the Parties in Durban. The fund has to become equitable and operational as the result of the Durban conference.

These two are my personal minimun expectations for COP-17 in Durban, and I hope not to be too badly disappointed. This is not to say there could be no positive results from other Bali Action Plan elements, such as tech transfer or adaptation. But I dare not hope for that. And I dare not even dream of second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol. But I hope I could dream to be positively surprised in Durban..